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1. INTRODUCTION (relevance for risk practitioners, developing countries and UN World Food Program) 
In this decade, a Global Catastrophic Risk (GCR) or the effect of several extreme weather events could lead to multiple bread 
basket failure and a 10% global food deficit or worse (Denkenberger and Pearce, 2014).  Lloyds of London recently published a 
scenarioi describing a possible food system shock with global impact (GFSS).  Research for the UK Foreign Office suggest that 
due to extreme weather events alone there is an 80% risk of this degree of shock in this century (Bailey et al., 2015). The 
reinsurance industry in the London and USA is now addressing many of these risks. GCRs from non-weather causes include so 
many quantifiable “low probability high impact” risks to the food-transport-energy nexusii  that in aggregate they have a greater 
than 1 in 10 probability of occurring in any given 10 year period (D C Denkenberger and Pearce, 2016). In addition, more than 5 
shocks of less than 3% of global output can also be expected with high confidence.  This is only from known extreme weather 
events, so the total risk is greater (3% is still very serious – the 2008 food price spike was linked to a loss of less than 0.2% and 
perhaps more a result of factors other than actual shortage). So it can be considered extremely likely that disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) staff and others involved with the Hyogo/Sendai framework and food, security, logistics, diplomacy, consulting or politics 
will be involved in preparedness for or responding to at least two such unprecedented global events in their lifetime.  Awareness 
is also increasing concerning the specific and multiple vulnerabilities of regional and global transport systemsiii For journalists or 
those who are skeptical about reinsurers or the predictability of individual events, it is possible to simply make this argument: 
“Make an allowance for stresses from climate/ population growth/ resource pressure, and for unknown risks, and then assume a 
normal or poisson distribution of shocks in any given century, and take account of the obvious likelihood that everyone will have 
to deal with at least one outlier or Black Swan event. Taken together, it is not hard to believe that most people alive today can 
expect with fair confidence to live through several food shocks worse than 2008 and at least one major global food system shock 
GFSS or, in the worst case, 'actual global famine' ”. This would put 100 million people at risk of starvation within months, and 
conceivably up to 2 billion deaths across Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the Americas within 2 years  (Helfand, 2013). 
“Sometimes the worst case does happen.” John Ewert, USGS 
 
Pinatubo,  a VEI 6 eruption during Typhoon Yunya.  
June 15, 1991 
'“Climate impact was stronger than an El Nino event.”' 
(USGS) 
Note that VEI- 7 eruptions put 10 times more material 
into the atmosphere than Pinatubo, with correspondingly 
greater impacts on temperature and rainfall, putting 
harvests at risk globally. 
 
In these scenarios, given no additional preparedness, the UN’s World Food Program and other major relief agencies would be 
completely unable to source sufficient food/logistics capacity for famine relief, which implies a need for alternate approaches, so 
very relevant for Sendai and SDG target 1.5 (resilience in developing countries). 
Among known examples of GCRs are atypical crop pathogen, abrupt climate change, regional nuclear war, and level 7 volcanic 
eruption. In almost all of these, reinsurance and increased grain storage are not sufficient to prevent sustained food shortages, or 
 
even viable and fundable given shipping constraints and other currently pressing global priorities such as already existing 
malnutrition, poverty and insecurities. 
The Hyogo/Sendai Framework, does not explicitly address all non-climate global catastrophic risks (GCRs). Nevertheless, the 
Hyogo framework sections on regional and national actors and coordination provide a necessary foundation for effective 
preparedness, response and gap identification in relation to GCRs. 
Our goal is to support preparedness work, response planning and assessments of convertible/re-deployable capacity which would 
support national and regional DRR networks to save many lives in the event of any global catastrophic risk which affects 
multiple breadbaskets. (SDG target 11.5) Our particular concern is scenarios affecting populous developing nations, or scenarios 
where WFP and other major relief agencies were unable to source serious quantities of any staples at all from exporting nations 
or on open markets for a period of 2-24 months. (SDG target 13.1 resilience and adaptive capacity) 
In our full paper we intend to address issues of climate/water stress, sovereignty, participatory planning, impacts on and 
leadership by women of the Global South, Amartya Sen's work, transport, distribution etc. Chatham House staff in London are 
among those looking at economic and diplomatic aspects of potential freight choke points in nexus shock scenarios (i.e. the food-
energy-transport nexus, as defined by the Global Sustainability Institute, UK.)ii, iii 
2. CATASTROPHIC RISKS and REGIONAL/GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM VULNERABILITY 
Duty of Care = Duty of Preparedness (Sendai Priority Areas 1 & 2) 
We are here discussing a large number of low probability high impact risks, mostly not climate related, though in most cases 
droughts/floods/heat stress/storm damage are likely to be pre-existing or complicating stressors.  (Denkenberger and Pearce, 
2015). In aggregate, these risks, where known and quantifiable, added to extreme weather risks have around a 10% probability of 
occurring per decade (Bailey et al., 2015; D C Denkenberger and Pearce, 2016). They don't all destroy crops immediately, but 
what would affect food prices immediately (and is in itself a hazard) despite the best efforts of the Rapid Response Forum, would 
be media reports of a projected global food deficit. The reinsurance industry (including Willis Re and a major US reinsurer) is 
now addressing these high impact risksiv . This means that some industries are being forced to show investors they have 
addressed these risks. There are historical precedents for thisv. Taking as a given that lives matter more than money, we consider 
that some degree of preparedness is also a professional duty of care for governments, academics, funders, relevant private sector 
organisations and senior DRR professionals. Current learning in integrated risk management, especially at the regional level, can 
and should be scaled up to address such risks.  IMF, World Bank, WWF, US Navy analysts, Mars, several foreign ministries (e.g. 
UK, USA), Mars Cargill and others are looking at aspects of thisvi. The UK's recent EU referendum experience has recently 
shown how a lack of preparedness even for a predictable event with few physical impacts can cause economic trauma, so it is not 
hard to imagine that an unexpected event with major physical impacts on crops or transport systems would need good 
preparedness in place, including not only DRR professionals, but the whole range of integrative risk disciplines, also diplomats 
and media professionals (and their older colleagues and on-call lawyers, who can potentially act as an “institutional memory and 
prompt” during periods of crisis). 
When considering shocks to the global food system, most current research focuses on scenarios which cut total global output by 
much less than 5%. A sub-group of the GCR research community looks specifically at “lifeboat scenarios” where 90%-100% of 
global output is hit. There is therefore an obvious gap in published literature for scenarios in the 5-20% and 20-90% ranges. 
These scenarios are both much more likely than 100% scenarios, and offer researchers much more scope to contribute to saving 
large numbers of lives. Now that many of the risks have been assessed quantitatively, and no longer form part of poorly thought 
through science fiction and distorted Hollywood alarmism, the lack of literature and preparedness is unconscionable and (perhaps 
legally?) negligent. We have a collective duty of care to redress this before we find ourselves struck by an impact we have no 
readiness for, at a time when front line staff and budgets are already overstressed responding to climate stress, conflict and 
refugees. Hoping that we are no longer alive “before or after the comet strikes” is not a sufficient response, now that we know 
that zero cost and low cost preparedness is possible. 
2. PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS 
Cheaper than storage, better than refugees 
The kind of operation conducted by the US military and civil marine to avert a famine in India in 1965vii (when there was more 
than a few months’ warning) would be a tremendous challenge for any merchant fleet currently available, even with several 
months warning. So, for similar or worse or more sudden scenarios, advance work is needed to determine what could be done, by 
whom, and what other options there are for worst case scenarios (other than conventional deliveries of food aid by WFP and 
others). Without stress tests, apparently quite minor problems become very significant: for example, as of March 2016, there are 
no ports in South Africa where sufficient silt has been dredged to enable the docking of major relief supplies, meaning that even 
media reports alone of corn harvest failure could cause a crisis, not just in South Africa itself but across the whole of southern 
 
Africa. In most cases, these GCRs (combined with choke points/limitations on distribution) can not be protected against simply 
by increased grain storage, especially if North America is affected by the GCR (as the US and Canada supply so much grain to 
WFP and others). However, recent work on catastrophic risks, risk mitigation, ramp-up rates and alternate foods suggests that 
these scenarios, given good preparedness and prompt decisions nationally and multilaterally, could, given prompt decisions, play 
out much more favourably, probably at very low cost per life saved (D C Denkenberger and Pearce, 2016). In one of the very 
worst (and very unlikely) scenarios, a VEI 8 eruption, there would be a 5 year winter, but even here, Baum, Denkenberger and 
Pearce have shown how, with “cooperation between continents”, enough food could be produced to feed 10 billion people and 
also some populations of large mammals (Baum et al., 2016). A small but clear example is that biofuel plants could be quickly 
converted to produce food. A key intervention would be making protein from natural gas via bacteria, a technology already in use 
in fish farming. There are even historic precedents relevant to the urban context which we have space only to list: (a) the nation-
wide introduction of building regulations reduced US fire-deaths massively and this elimination of a “local catastrophic risk” and 
was forced by reinsurersv (b) in the UK during World War 2, there was a massive increase in domestic food production (c) during 
US prohibition, breweries were converted to produce carbonated beverages and baked goods. In an emergency, a brewery is a 
giant biological plant with chemistry that can produce carbohydrate and much else from a variety of inputs. In Africa, many 
women brew at home, so scale here is adaptable - many traditional survival strategies could become very valuable across multiple 
regions with similar climate/soil/human resources. 
Research gaps 
Risk and 
consequence 
Research is needed to establish likely starvation and malnutrition rates with a range of scenarios. (This has been done for 
nuclear war scenarios and human epidemics, but for little else (David C Denkenberger and Pearce, 2016)) 
Industry/ 
technologies 
What are the ramp up rates in both conventional and alternate food production, and also in distribution, and what could be 
done in advance to increase them? Which technologies currently available but not in extensive and widespread use, would 
become useful and affordable with a severe food deficit? 
Legislation Would legislation (e.g. to ensure rapid convertibility of biofuels plants to safe human food production) be helpful? 
Strategic studies What stress tests be conducted to identify hazardous and critical choke points have been done, and what others are needed? In 
>10% GCRs, or extreme catastrophes affecting  30%-90% of harvests on just 1-3 continents, could preparedness work on 
affected and unaffected continents make the difference between a billion casualties and tens of thousands? Would some 
regions need to rely on traditional resilience and/ or organised migration and/or specialised support teams? 
Politics/ 
communication/ 
emotion 
Would, in reality, the US or another industrial power assemble a coalition of cooperators, and if so, what advance work would 
ensure the Global South would be fully included? What led to non-cooperative choices in the 2008 food price spike, and what 
led to cooperation in the following food price crisis?  There is no published response plan for any global shock impacting 
>10% of global food supply, and little for anything over 5% – is there perhaps a good reason why not? What has been the 
effect of communication on these topics to date? Why? Are there lessons from swine flu and Ebola about alarmism vs 
complacency, emotions and speed of response? Can responses to global catastrophic events be prepared effectively in 
advance at multi-lateral levels? Can they be drilled? If not, can they usefully be simulated or stress tested or prepared using 
scenario planning exercises? Does the reality of the internet, and the reality that most over 20s don't yet see its full potential, 
mean that we under-estimate national and global response capacities? 
Global media & 
response 
Is there a useful role for media work in presenting a case for pragmatic GCR preparedness? Could the media inform public 
and politicians about preparedness and cooperation options in a helpful or unhelpful way now, in the 2020s, or in the event of 
a catastrophe? Would advance training be necessary, and who should receive it? What would make the difference between 
helpful and unhelpful, defining helpful as leading to inter-continental cooperation and unhelpful as encouraging escalating 
conflict or beggar-thy-neighbour? Will more communication and media attention to these topics enhance and support 
cooperative action, or, as in examples of early-warning, could it lead to buck-passing, and what determines the difference? 
And how will social media, the internet and virtual reality change everything in these scenarios? 
Economics What is the value of research on these topics compared to climate adaptation, income generation in least developed countries, 
etc? 
 
FURTHER STEPS: Integral Global Catastrophic Risk Management and Sendai Framework / SDGs 
In the middle of a chaotic environmental or military crisis in 2018, 2028 or 2038, politicians, diplomats and civil servants will 
already be dealing urgently with a host of immediate negative consequences, and international negotiation or conflict, and 
worried or angry domestic populations and (perhaps most challenging of all) distressed family members and ambitious or 
maverick colleagues. In such an environment (which may include financial collapse or breakdown of trading systems) it is 
unrealistic to expect them to think and plan months ahead to ensure the recovery of food systems, especially if this requires 
mobilising resources which haven't been previously identified, assessed, tested and (ideally) researched and drilled over a period 
of 3 years. The situation would be much better if industry, academics, DRR planners and logistics/ food/ agriculture/ freight/ 
energy/ consulting companies, etc had already (i.e. during 2016-2019) looked at what production could be ramped up (or 
converted or created, where, how quickly) and how quickly food could be moved to where needed, without needing or expecting 
politicians to be able to focus on this and give a clear lead in the initial days and weeks – they will have enough to deal with 
already, and intelligent choices by industry, NGOs, cities, towns and media leadership may make the difference between a 
difficult but valuable struggle, and global panic or despair and folly. 
 
We recognize that this all needs to be set in the context of duties, responsibilities, entitlements and capabilities at state and 
community levels. So, our goal is to encourage work now which can help the DRR community and others save many lives in the 
event of a >10% shock, secondary to a global catastrophic event, a global catastrophic disaster risk response (GC-DRR?!) 
As I write this I hear in the background on the BBC World Service radio an account of the Mount Pinatubo eruption (from which 
I took the USGS quote about how the worst sometimes does happen). Although this was “only” a VEI level 6 eruption, it 
happened at the same time as a typhoon, and caused an almost 1F drop in global average surface temperatures. In 2008 and again 
in 2011, two individuals were able to persuade governments of Japan and Ukraine respectively to release food onto markets, 
preventing sustained high prices and so stopping a long uptick in malnutrition-related deaths. In a more extreme scenario, with an 
actual global deficit (which was not the situation in these two cases) it would not be possible to prevent mass starvation in this 
way. 
We propose: 
1. INTEGRATIVE DIALOGUE (Sendai Priority  Areas 1, 2): publications and an online seminar series or e-symposium to 
bridge the gap between two very distinct communities of researchers, practitioners, policy makers and funders: 
   DRR           - // -  GCR *   
 disaster risk reduction     global catastrophic risk 
 
2. EXPERTISE (Sendai 1, 4): creation of a combined GCR-DRR web-gallery of expert advisers, companies, consultancies, 
departments and faculties. (E.g. in some scenarios there is a huge increase in UV light, so need fast-growing UV-resistant crops.) 
3. STRATEGY (Sendai 2, 4): convene a joint DRR-GCR working group and/or lean project to collect recommendations on 
priority preparedness work from DRR & GCR professionals, aimed at specific industries, universities, funders and governments. 
4. INTEGRATION (Sendai 1): formally recommending the initiation of seminar series at “integrating schools” (e.g. Oxford 
University's Martin School & FHI, CSER Cambridge, University of Western Cape/Pretoria, FLI Boston, GSR Princeton and 
others in strategic locations such as Cornell, Beijing, Stanford/Berkeley Tokyo/Hyogo/Seoul, Colombo/Trivandrum/Dacca, 
Wellington, St Petersburg, Buenos Aires, etc) …. with an initial focus on this theme which has struck a chord at Cornell: “scope 
for re-deploying existing research and applications (other than storage) in the case of a global systemic shock or catastrophic 
event”. 
5. INDUSTRY (Sendai 3): assessments of convertible capacity and rapid ramp up potential, country by country, in both 
conventional and alternate food production and distribution. Specifically, GRF, WFP and Rapid Response Forum to invite 
governments and industry bodies to assess their potential “GCR ramp up rates” in conventional and alternate food production, 
adjusted for seasonality, as well as deployable and convertible shipping capacity and ability to create agricultural or engineering 
recovery teams, and to consider a range of national response and preparedness options for a 10% or 20% global GFSS. 
6. RESPONSE PLANNING (Sendai 2): appropriate response planning and preparedness at national, academic, GRF and (if 
possible and not counter-productive) at regional/global levels (not forgetting, for both rich and poor countries, traditional 
subsistence & survival practices, bachelor crops, scope for organised migration to areas with viable aquifers, etc) 
COORDINATION – NO. We specifically do not propose creating a new supra-national body or committee, as the existence or 
convening of such a body at any time would likely become an amplifier or secondary cause of instability – better, we currently 
suspect, to strengthen existing capacities and organizations, including media legal staff, who can remind news teams about the 
resource pack held by in-house science editors and producers for use in the event of a major catastrophe, famine or cataclysm. 
Conclusion 
Being well-prepared globally, by sector and regionally can reduce the likelihood of panic export bans and other self-defeating 
options in the future, and build current self-interested trust/cooperation between countries, continents and industries. We have 
proposed next steps for the DRR community, GRF, academics, governments and private sector. Taken together, these steps can 
prevent 100 million-2 billion starvation and malnutrition deaths in the lifetime of younger readers of this paper at GRF Davos in 
2016. The role of the Global Risk Forum as a whole may be to convince industry, large consultancies and at least one scientific 
 
body to take on this work (namely, practical preparedness for shocks affecting 10%-20% of global harvests) in a focused and 
coordinated way.viii 
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viii  Abstract:  
 Lloyds of London and others have demonstrated how a global systemic shock and multiple bread basket 
failure in the near future could lead to starvation deaths or war. We show how such scenarios are both likely 
and preventable.  
 Research for the UK's Foreign Office suggest that there is an 80% risk of systemic shock cutting ~10% of 
agricultural output in this century caused by known extreme weather risks alone. The largest reinsurers and the 
Nexus Shock Network are now addressing these risks. There are in addition abrupt and known non-weather 
“low probability high impact” risks which could lead to a similar or greater global food deficit. These “Global 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Catastrophic Risks” collectively have ~1 in 10 probability of occurring per decade. With the possible 
exceptions of China, USA and South Korea, current resilience, financial systems and relief capacity are 
designed to mitigate only limited food price increases (such as in 2008 which was caused by impacts totalling 
<1% of global output) and not an abrupt 2-10% shock or worse, where without more preparedness it could be 
expected that governments, even with support from WFP and other major relief agencies, would be unable to 
source and distribute enough food to prevent food riots and government collapses. Without both internationals 
(industry, IMF, markets, Rapid Response Forum, UN insurers, disaster professionals, etc) and nationals 
(governments, broadcasters, private sector logistics, agriculture, etc.) having extraordinary stop-gap famine 
preparedness measures ready and stress tested, the run-up in global food prices would likely be much more 
severe than 2007-8 and last for months or years, leading to mass refugee flows, perhaps in unexpected 
directions.  So food shortage and distribution problems or conflict could cause “actual global famine”, with 
widespread economic collapses, potentially putting 100 million people at risk of starvation and within 2 year 
conceivably up to 2 billion deaths across Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the Americas (Helfand, 2013). 
 As a duty of care, current learning in integrative risk management can and should be scaled up to address 
such risks through the UN Sendai process, building on the Hyogo framework. The IMF, World Bank, Chatham 
House and several governments (e.g. UK and USA) are looking at specific aspects of this, leaving many gaps, 
especially in relation to Africa, Asia and the Americas where (e.g.) Nigeria, Brazil and India have additional 
challenges such as distribution and total population. 
   We explore some possible responses, preparedness options, research gaps and usefulness of “alternate 
foods” such as quick diversion of modified biofuels to edible oils/carbs and innovative uses of residues, waste, 
leaves, woody matter, methane and bacteria. These options together with distribution readiness would 
dramatically reduce mortality in a global catastrophic risk event. Food secure continents attract more sustained 
investment. Some of the preparedness options and alternate foods have further present time benefits, making 
them more easily fundable. Being well-prepared globally can reduce the likelihood of panic export bans and 
other self-defeating options in the future, and build present time trust/cooperation between countries, 
continents and industries, preventing beggar-thy-neighbour scenarios. 
 We make suggestions for the Hyogo / Sendai framework and to the risk and disaster communities for (1) 
immediately doable preparedness actions with high value and low cost per life saved, and (2) initial 
assessments and research (3) integration and knowledge exchange opportunities (4) funding strategies and 
financial sustainability. 
